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1147 
A Compromise Solution to Prevent 
Fraudulent Claims Under IIRIRA 
Section 601(a) 
A SYSTEM OF CONDITIONAL GRANTS 
INTRODUCTION 
A young Chinese woman is caught with fake travel documents at 
John F. Kennedy Airport. Later, she recounts her experience:  
I told [the immigration official], as instructed by my snakehead,1 “I am 
married. I already have a child, and I am now pregnant. The Chinese 
government was about to force me to have an abortion,” and so on and so forth. 
It was really a joke. I was not even married. They took my fingerprints and 
released me.2  
Fraudulent stories regarding China’s coercive population measures, just 
like the story told above, are all too common at the borders of the United 
States. Although, in a strange turn of events, it is usually men, rather than 
women, who are telling them.3 The problem has arisen as a result of 
legislation intended to provide a solution for an extremely serious human 
rights concern in China, which has instead often been used as a tool to 
defraud the United States into granting asylum benefits to undeserving 
aliens. 
In 1996, after facing years of strong social and political pressure 
to help those persecuted under China’s family planning methods,4 
  
 1 Those who are in charge of Chinese human smuggling are called snakeheads. Cleo J. 
Kung, Comment, Supporting the Snakeheads: Human Smuggling from China and the 1996 
Amendment to the U.S. Statutory Definition of “Refugee,” 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1271, 
1274 (2000).  
 2 Id. at 1306-07. 
 3 See Paul Sperry, Chinese Aliens Flock to O’Hare: Immigrants with Bogus Asylum 
Claims Flooding America’s Busiest Airport, WORLDNETDAILY, Feb. 6, 2003, available at 
http://worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=30903; see also Elisabeth Rosenthal, 
Chinese Town’s Main Export: Its Young Men, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2000 (discussing the fact that 
since 1990, approximately 80% of the middle-age men in one Chinese town have left for the West, 
usually for the United States).  
 4 Kimberly Sicard, Section 601 of IIRIRA: A Long Road to a Resolution of United States 
Asylum Policy Regarding Coercive Methods of Population Control, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 927, 932-
36 (2000). Sicard describes the increased social pressure on the United States government arising 
after pro-democracy rallies in Tiananmen Square were stifled by 150,000 Chinese troops in 1989 
and after a freight ship named the Golden Venture ran aground in New York in 1993 carrying 276 
Chinese refugees, of which 90% filed for asylum relief based on China’s One-Child Policy. She also 
discusses the political pressure coming from both human rights advocates and pro-life activists. Id. 
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Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA” or “Act”).5 The aim of section 601(a) of 
the Act, although not explicitly stated, was to provide relief to victims of 
China’s coercive population control practices.6 To accomplish this 
purpose, section 601(a) broadened the definition of “refugee”7 to include 
those who have been forced to undergo an abortion and/or sterilization, 
or who have been persecuted for any other resistance to a country’s 
population control methods.8 While it is undisputed that section 601(a) 
grants per se refugee status to those claimants who are the direct victims 
of persecution under the population control policies, there is great 
disagreement among the United States Courts of Appeals over whether 
the same relief should be given to indirect, physically unharmed, partner 
victims solely on the basis of their partner’s persecution. This 
disagreement largely stems from a decision rendered by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), the administrative agency charged with 
implementing section 601(a), one year after section 601(a)’s enactment. 
In In re C-Y-Z-, the BIA held that section 601(a) also gives the “spouse” 
  
 5 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).  
 6 Sicard, supra note 4, at 927 (“Although Congress wrote the statute to apply to any 
country employing coercive methods of population control, China and the One Child Policy are 
clearly the statute’s subjects.”); see also Thomas L. Hunker, Generational Genocide: Coercive 
Population Control as a Basis for Asylum in the United States, 15 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 131, 
140 (2005-2006). In fact, at the time section 601(a) was adopted, “China [was] the only country 
reported to have mandatory population control policies.” Katherine L. Vaughns, Retooling the 
“Refugee” Definition: The New Immigration Reform Law’s Impact on United States Domestic 
Asylum Policy, 1 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 41, 86 (1998-1999).  
 7 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) originally read:  
The term “refugee” means (A) any person who is outside any country of such person’s 
nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in 
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, 
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country 
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, or (B) in such 
special circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation…may specify, any 
person who is within the country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person 
having no nationality, within the country in which such person is habitually residing, and 
who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 
Id. IIRIRA’s section 601(a)(1) expanded this definition to read:  
For purposes of determinations under this Act, a person who has been forced to abort a 
pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure 
or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population 
control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political 
opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to 
undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance 
shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on account of political 
opinion.  
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).  
 8 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).  
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of a persecuted person per se qualification for refugee status.9 This 
holding and the subsequent Courts of Appeals decisions interpreting it 
have paved a path by which indirect male partner victims can easily 
qualify for asylum relief under section 601(a). In doing so, these 
decisions have opened the door for widespread abuse by many men who 
are using false claims based on the alleged persecution of their female 
partner to qualify as refugees in the United States.  
This Note, through exploration of the humanitarian crisis in 
China and the U.S. government’s response to it, argues that new 
legislation is required in order to clearly address the seriousness of the 
Chinese birth control practices and the justifiable U.S. immigration 
concerns of limiting fraudulent refugee claims, both of which have been 
muddled by the courts’ inconsistent attempts to balance these somewhat 
conflicting objectives. Part I of this Note gives a brief history of China’s 
population control policies. Part II discusses the U.S. refugee system in 
general, and how section 601(a) of the IIRIRA has changed this general 
scheme. Part III discusses the Courts of Appeals’ interpretations of the 
section 601(a). Finally, Part IV begins by explaining how some of these 
courts’ broad interpretations of the scope of section 601(a) have allowed 
many men to fraudulently enter into the United States based on the 
alleged persecution of their female partners. Part IV then goes on to 
suggest that a legislative amendment that creates a system of conditional 
grants of refugee status would serve the dual purpose of benefiting the 
true victims of the coercive family planning methods, as section 601(a) 
was intended to do, while also deterring these fraudulent claims by 
indirect male victims.10  
I.  CHINA’S ONE-CHILD POLICY 
The People’s Republic of China (“China”) has a lengthy, and 
rather contradictory, history of regulating its population growth. From 
  
 9 In re C-Y-Z, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 918-19 (BIA 1997) (“We find that the applicant in 
this case has established eligibility for asylum by virtue of his wife’s forced sterilization.”).  
 10  See Karen Y. Crabbs, United States Domestic Policies and Chinese Immigrants: 
Where Should Judges Draw the Line When Granting Political Asylum?, 7 FLA. J. INT’L L. 249, 250 
n.3 (1992). Crabbs illustrates the delicacy of deciding whether to grant asylum: 
 For political reasons, a country which grants foreigners asylum must be careful that such 
action does not appear too judgmental and thus undermine international relations with the 
country from which the applicants are fleeing. A country must be careful when granting 
immigrants asylum for economic reasons as well. Many American economists advocate 
an extremely selective policy of asylum determination. They view incoming immigrants 
simply as possible moneymakers or moneytakers. If we take the former, we will enrich 
our country; but if we choose the latter, we end up a poorer nation because the immigrant 
will subtract value from our country. Other arguments for limiting immigration into the 
United States include the effect the additional population would have on the environment 
or on unemployment and other social problems. At the current rate of birth but without 
large-scale immigration, the United States could maintain a stable population.  
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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the country’s founding in 1949 and throughout the 1950s, the central 
government, rather than trying to limit population growth, actively 
encouraged it.11 In fact, the Chinese government was convinced that a 
large population was necessary to meet the production needs of the 
socialist country.12 In addition to governmental concerns, Chinese 
citizens, few of whom benefited from social security or pension plans, 
had many children to ensure their well-being in old age.13 Moreover, in 
rural areas, children were (and still are) often needed for increased labor 
power on the farms.14 These factors, combined with the traditional desire 
to carry on the family name,15 led to rapid population growth in the 
country. By 1970, most Chinese women gave birth to six children in their 
lifetime.16 In light of this population boom, the central government was 
suddenly faced with “massive starvation” and “economic and social 
stagnation.”17 These concerns led the government to create the “wan, xi, 
shao” campaign, translated as “later, longer, fewer,” which encouraged 
couples to marry later, wait longer after marriage to have children, and 
have fewer children in total.18 In 1979, the Chinese government 
determined that more drastic measures were required, and so it adopted a 
comprehensive family planning policy to help combat population 
  
 11 Gerrie Zhang, U.S. Asylum Policy and Population Control in the People’s Republic of 
China, 18 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 557, 560 (1996). China was “convinced that a large population was 
favorable for production and socialist construction.” The central government at this time completely 
disregarded warnings from world-renowned economists concerning the dangers of such a policy of 
unchecked population growth. Sara E. Stewart, Lin v. United States Dep’t of Justice: The Circuits 
Split on the Issue of Whether Marital Status is Dispositive of Asylum Eligibility in the United States 
for Individuals Who Suffer Persecution Under China’s Coercive Family Planning Practices, 59 ME. 
L. REV. 169, 172 (2007).  
 12 Zhang, supra note 11. Mao Zedong has stated: “It is a very good thing that China has a 
big population . . . . Of all the things in the world, people are the most precious.” Christie N. Love, 
Not In Our Country? A Critique of the United States Welfare System Through the Lens of China’s 
One-Child Law, 14 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 142, 149 (2005) (quoting JOHN S. AIRD, SLAUGHTER OF 
THE INNOCENTS: COERCIVE BIRTH CONTROL IN CHINA 22 (1990)).  
 13 Sicard, supra note 4, at 928. 
 14 Id.; see also Grey Areas in China’s One-Child Policy, BBC NEWS, Sept. 21, 2007 
[hereinafter Grey Areas], available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7002201.stm (“Rural 
families also want boys so they can help with farm work.”). 
 15 Sicard, supra note 4 (“In addition, sons continue the family line.”); see also, Grey 
Areas, supra note 14 (Mrs. Wu, a Chinese citizens states, “When I got married I only wanted one 
child. But because it was a girl, my parents-in-law wanted me to try for a boy to carry on the family 
name.”).  
 16 Kyle R. Rabkin, The Zero-Child Policy: How the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Discriminates Against Unmarried Asylum-Seekers Fleeing Coercive Family Planning Measures, 101 
NW. U.L. REV. 965, 969 (2007). 
 17 Charles E. Schulman, The Grant of Asylum to Chinese Citizens Who Oppose China’s 
One-Child Policy: A Policy of Persecution or Population Control?, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 313, 
317 (1996). China felt the consequences of its unimpeded population growth when, by 1979, the 
country was trying to sustain over 20% of the world’s entire population with less than 8% of the 
world’s arable land. Id. at 316-17; see also Kung, supra note 1, at 1303 (noting that even as early as 
1958, famine ensued and that “[b]etween 1958 and 1962, a nationwide famine killed at least 20 
million people”).  
 18 Stewart, supra note 11. The goal of the campaign was to have a growth rate of zero by 
2000. Schulman, supra note 17. 
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growth.19 Of central importance to this plan was the implementation of 
the “one couple, one child” policy20—popularly known today as the 
“One-Child Policy” (“OCP”).21 The OCP generally restricts married 
Chinese couples to having one child, although there are some notable 
exceptions to the rule.22  
In 1981, the government created the State Family Planning 
Commission (“SFPC”) to set target population goals.23 The SFPC, in 
turn, delegates the task of monitoring and enforcing OCP targets to 
officials at the provincial and local levels.24 While this decentralized 
system has led to varying enforcement techniques throughout China’s 
provinces, local officials have generally put into place a stick-and-carrot 
system of economic and social rewards and penalties to encourage 
couples to comply with the OCP rules.25 Couples that abide by the OCP, 
for example, may be rewarded with cash stipends for their child’s 
medical and educational purposes, a larger residence for their family, and 
extended time off from work for the mother after giving birth.26 On the 
other hand, punishments for disobeying the OCP range from monetary 
penalties, to job demotions or firings, to imprisonment and the seizure or 
destruction of the couple’s property.27 The most extreme enforcement 
techniques include forced Intrauterine Device (“IUD”) insertions, late-
term abortions, and sterilizations.28 Although the central government has 
officially condemned all such coercive methods since 1984,29 local 
  
 19 Zhang, supra note 11, at 561; see also Information Office of the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China, A Strategic Policy That Suits National Conditions § I ¶ 5 (1995), 
available at http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/familypanning/13-2.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).  
 20 Zhang, supra note 11, at 561.  
 21 Eloisa A. Rivera, Comment, Authorized Marriages Only? Refugee Relief Under 
Section 601(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 40 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 229, 233-34 (2006).  
 22 The term “One Child Policy” is a bit of a misnomer, as there are a number of 
exceptions to the one couple, one child rule. For example, in some cases ethnic minorities are 
allowed to have more than one child. Likewise, couples in rural areas who have a daughter as their 
first child may be permitted a second after a certain amount of time. Zhang, supra note 11, at 561-62 
(1996); see also Grey Areas, supra note 14 (A “significant number of people” have more than one 
child either because they fall under one of the exceptions, or because they ignore the rules, no matter 
what the consequences. In fact, “[i]n July [of 2007], it was revealed that nearly 2,000 officials and 
celebrities in Hunan Province breached the nation’s family planning regulations between 2000 and 
2005.”).  
 23 Schulman, supra note 17.  
 24 Id. at 317-18. Thirteen million volunteers also partake in enforcing the OCP. Id. at 318. 
 25 Zhang, supra note 11, at 562. In addition, education is used to teach people about the 
dangers of continued population growth. Id.  
 26 Id. at 563. 
 27 Erin Bergeson Hull, Note, When Is the Unmarried Partner of an Alien Who Has Been 
Forcibly Subjected to Abortion or Sterilization a “Spouse” for the Purpose of Asylum Eligibility? 
The Diverging Opinions of Ma v. Ashcroft and Chen v. Ashcroft, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1021, 1025 
(2005).  
 28 Id. at 1025-26.  
 29 SUSAN GREENHALGH & EDWIN A. WINKLER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION & 
NATURALIZATION SERV., CHINESE STATE BIRTH PLANNING IN THE 1990S AND BEYOND 16 (2001), 
available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/pschn01001.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 
2008).  
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officials routinely turn to such practices in fear of punishment for failure 
to meet the quotas set in place by the SFPC.30 In fact, by the mid-1980s, 
forced birth control practices, including abortions, sterilizations, and IUD 
insertions, averaged nearly thirty million per year.31  
Another integral tool in China’s family planning policy is its 
Marriage Law of 1980,32 which sets forth minimum marriage ages—
twenty for females and twenty-two for males.33 However, these ages are 
only a floor and in many provinces the local governments have set the 
actual minimum age for marriage a number of years higher.34 The 
Marriage Law also requires every couple to register their marriage with 
the government.35 If a couple fails to get this registration or their 
registration is denied, i.e., because one of the partners is below the 
minimum age, the government will not legally recognize the marriage, 
and the couple will not be legally permitted to have a child.36 Marriage 
without this official government authorization is termed a “traditional” 
marriage.37 If a woman gets pregnant while in a traditional, rather than a 
“legal,” marriage, local officials once again have wide discretion in 
punishing the couple and aborting the child, even where that child would 
only be the couple’s first child.38  
Through the combination of such laws and enforcement 
techniques, Chinese officials have recently reported that since its 
implementation the OCP has been responsible for preventing 
  
 30 Id.; see also, Hannah Beech, Enemies of the State?, TIME, Sept. 12, 2005 (“One set of 
bad population figures can stop an official from getting promoted.”). Beech also explains that local 
officials in Linyi started mass sterilizations and abortions after getting castigated for having the 
highest rate of extra births in Shandong. Id.; Rivera, supra note 21, at 235 n.40 (noting that “[t]he 
Chinese government rewards local officials who achieve the birth quotas for their province. . . . [b]ut 
it also punishes them with sanctions, demotions, and salary reductions if they fail to achieve the 
quotas”). Since “the goal is to achieve the targeted birth quota, family-planning officials are 
obligated and motivated to track down women with ‘out-of-plan’ pregnancies and make sure that 
they have abortions, regardless of how far their pregnancies have advanced.” Xiaorong Li, License 
to Coerce: Violence Against Women, State Responsibility, and Legal Failures in China’s Family 
Planning Program, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 145, 163 (1996).  
 31 Hunker, supra note 6, at 134. 
 32 Marriage Law (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 10, 1980, effective Jan. 
1, 1981) LEXIS PRCLEG 11 (P.R.C.). 
 33 Id. art. 5. These age minimums are “easily the highest in the world.” See Rabkin, 
supra note 16, at 971; see also Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that “it 
appears probable that no other country sets the minimum as high as does China”). Article 5 of the 
Marriage Law says that “late marriage and late childbirth” shall be encouraged. Marriage Law art. 5. 
 34 Rabkin, supra note 16, at 971. 
 35 Rivera, supra note 21, at 236. 
 36 Id. In fact, “[l]ocal officials require unmarried women to undergo frequent 
gynecological exams to ensure that they are not pregnant; if they are, they are required to have 
abortions.” Rabkin, supra note 16, at 972.  
 37 See Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 555 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 38 Rivera, supra note 21, at 237; see also Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 555 (9th Cir. 
2004) (an example of a woman being forced to abort her child because she wasn’t in a legal 
marriage, even though the couple had no other children yet).  
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approximately 400 million births.39 Despite calls for change to stop this 
“ongoing genocide,”40 coercive enforcement methods are still widely 
used in China today.41 In fact, a recent congressional hearing reported 
that “China’s drive to control its population growth at any cost to the 
Chinese people is as strong and dangerous as ever.”42 While the OCP, 
when originally enacted, was supposed to be terminated by 2000,43 in 
2008 Chinese population officials said that the Policy will persist for at 
least another decade.44  
II.  UNITED STATES REFUGEE POLICY AND THE EFFECT OF SECTION 
601(A) ON THE DEFINITION OF “REFUGEE” 
A.  United States Refugee Policy 
Before specifically examining the U.S. government’s response to 
the extreme humanitarian crisis that has resulted from China’s OCP and 
other related population planning policies, it is useful to have a basic 
understanding of how a claimant can generally gain refugee status in the 
United States. This background information explains how the various 
broad or narrow interpretations of who falls under section 601(a) can 
have a major impact on how easily a claimant can gain refugee status. It 
  
 39 Has China’s One-Child Policy Worked? BBC NEWS, Sept. 20, 2007, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7000931.stm. This number was from 2007 and is up from 300 
million in 2003. A Brother for Her: Could China’s Most Notorious Social Policy Soon Be 
Scrapped?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 2004, available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-
129367160.html [hereinafter A Brother for Her]. The fertility rate has reportedly fallen from 2.29 
children per woman in 1980 to 1.69 children per woman in 2004. Id.  
 40 Stephen Moore, Don’t Fund UNFPA Population Control, WASH. TIMES, May 9, 1999 
(also referring to the OCP as a “fanatical crusade”), available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php 
?pub_id=5457; see also A Brother for Her, supra note 39 (discussing how some Chinese scholars 
believe that the costs of dealing with an aging population and the increasingly worrisome male to 
female sex ratio may outweigh the benefits of keeping the OCP in place and stating that “officials 
have hinted in the past that the policy could be eased after 2010”); James Reynolds, Chinese 
Challenge One-Child Policy, BBC NEWS, May 25, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/6694135.stm (discussing how one Chinese province recently burned cars and destroyed 
official buildings when officials tried to collect fines from those who had more than one child, and 
how many people take fertility drugs because, if you have more than one child at the same time, 
there are no penalties).  
 41 Although there is no hard data about how often coercive population control policies 
are really used, there are many undocumented stories of coercive techniques that are still widely 
practiced as part of enforcing the OCP. GREENHALGH & WINKLER, supra note 29.  
 42 China: Human Rights Violations and Coercion in One-Child Policy Enforcement: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Int’l Relations, 108th Cong. at 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/108/97363.pdf; see also Has China’s One-
Child Policy Worked?, supra note 39 (“And it looks likely that, nearly 30 years after the policy was 
first introduced, it will not be relaxed to allow couples to have more children. . . . At [a] press 
conference earlier this year, Minister Zhang said there was not the ‘slightest doubt’ about the need to 
continue with the policy.”). 
 43 Zhang, supra note 11, at 562 (“The one-child policy will be officially withdrawn in the 
year 2000.”). 
 44 Jim Yardley, China Says One-Child Policy Will Stay for at Least Another Decade, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2008, at A10 (“China’s top population official said the country’s one-child-
per-couple family planning policy would not change for at least another decade.”).  
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also highlights how broad interpretations of section 601(a) have made it 
much easier for Chinese men, with only a false claim of persecution, to 
gain refugee status, and why new legislation should be enacted to curb 
this problem. New legislation can help prevent the further diversion of 
resources away from those with genuine claims of persecution—those 
who section 601(a), and the refugee laws in general, are truly designed to 
protect. 
There are two main routes a migrant may take when seeking to 
gain asylum. First, a migrant may affirmatively seek asylum through a 
request to a U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) asylum 
officer, who will conduct an interview with the applicant and determine 
whether to grant asylum.45 If the USCIS officer denies the application, 
the applicant will then be able to go to immigration court where an 
immigration judge (“IJ”) will review his or her claim.46 Second, a 
migrant can seek asylum defensively through a ruling of an IJ once a 
removal proceeding has been brought against him or her.47 U.S. 
immigration law requires that aliens who arrive at a U.S. port of entry 
without, or with fraudulent, travel papers, must be detained and placed in 
expedited removal proceedings.48 At this point, the migrant can express a 
fear of persecution, and an IJ will review the case.49 Under either route to 
asylum, the BIA is responsible for hearing appeals from decisions of the 
IJs.50 All BIA decisions are then subject to review by the federal courts.51  
An asylum officer or IJ has discretion to grant the migrants 
application upon an affirmative finding that the alien meets the definition 
of a “refugee.”52 A “refugee,” in turn, is defined by 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(42) as a person who “is unable or unwilling to return to, and is 
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of [the 
applicant’s native country] because of persecution or a well-founded fear 
or persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.”53 What qualifies as 
  
 45 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Obtaining Asylum in the United States: Two 
Paths, available at www.uscis.gov (search “obtaining asylum in the United States”; then follow 
“Obtaining Asylum in the United States: Two Paths” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 27, 2009). If an 
application under the Refugee Act is made within the United States and granted, this person is said 
to have been granted “asylum.” If the application under the Refugee Act is made from outside the 
United States and granted, this person is said to have been granted “refugee status.” The terms are 
used interchangeably in this Note. See RapidImmigration.com, Political Asylum & Refugee Status, 
http://www.rapidimmigration.com/usa/1_eng_kit_asylum.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2009). 
 46 Obtaining Asylum in the United States: Two Paths, supra note 45.  
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 BIA Decisions, available at www.uscis.gov (follow “Laws & Regulations” hyperlink, 
then follow “BIA Decisions” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 31, 2009). The BIA is the highest 
administrative body within the Department of Homeland Security. Id.  
 51 Id.  
 52 Approval, Denial, or Referral of Application, 8 C.F.R. § 208.14 (2005).  
 53 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).  
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persecution on account of “political opinion” is where section 601(a), 
and the court interpretations of it, becomes so important.  
B.  IIRIRA Section 601(a) and Its Effect on the U.S. Refugee 
Qualifications 
Throughout the 1980s, reports of China’s coercive family 
planning enforcement practices spread worldwide, leading to 
international outrage and United States action.54 After years of 
unsuccessful proposed legislation by human rights activists55 to provide 
enhanced protection for victims of these “undeniable and grotesque 
violations of fundamental human rights,”56 efforts finally culminated 
with Congress’s 1996 enactment of section 601(a) of the IIRIRA.57 The 
specific language of section 601(a)(1) provides that: 
For purposes of determinations under this chapter, a person who has been 
forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has 
been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other 
resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have 
been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who has a well 
founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or 
subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to 
have a well founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.58  
The statute effectively eradicated the highly criticized59 prior 
practice of the BIA, by which the Board required Chinese asylum 
claimants to show that the coercive family planning practice was being 
selectively applied against them on account of one of the five 
enumerated protected classes in the “refugee” definition—race, religion, 
national origin, social group, or political opinion.”60 In other words, 
  
 54 Zhang, supra note 11, at 572 (discussing the U.S. withdrawal of financial support for 
the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) that provided assistance to China’s government in 
implementing the OCP).  
 55 Hunker, supra note 6, at 139 (discussing Attorney General Edwin Meese’s guidelines 
that would have permitted asylum for OCP victims as “the first of a litany of ‘botched efforts . . . to 
protect Chinese fleeing from their country’s one child policy’” (quoting Paula Abrams, Population 
Politics: Reproductive Rights and U.S. Asylum Policy, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 881, 882 (2000))); see 
also Abrams, infra, at 886 (discussing more failed efforts at helping OCP victims); Sicard, supra 
note 4, at 932-36. Many of the efforts for reform of treatment of persecuted women came from anti-
abortion and human rights advocates. Kristi Deans, Less Than Human: Children of a Couple in 
Violation of China’s Population Laws and the Barriers They Face in Claiming Asylum in the United 
States, 36 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 353, 360 (2006).  
 56 H. R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 174 (1996). 
 57 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) 
§ 601(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006). 
 58 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(42)(B). 
 59 Jamie Jordan, Note, Ten Years of Resistance to Coercive Population Control: Section 
601 of the IIRIRA of 1996 to Section 101 of the REAL ID Act of 2005, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 
229, 239 (2007).  
 60 Matter of G-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 764, 779 (1993) (“Coerced abortions and sterilization 
are certainly horrible acts. However, . . . the applicant has failed to show that the one couple, one 
 
1156 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:3 
section 601(a) eliminated the burden on OCP applicants of proving a 
“nexus” between their persecution under the OCP and one of these 
protected statuses.61 For example, before section 601(a) was enacted, an 
applicant would only meet the requirements of the refugee statute by 
showing that the OCP practices were being enforced against him or her 
because of his or her race or because of a specific political opinion he or 
she had. However, it was very difficult for an applicant to show that the 
OCP was being selectively enforced against him or her, since 
enforcement of the OCP is so widespread throughout China. Further, 
enforcement is done with the goal of population control in mind rather 
than with the goal of harming those of a particular religion, race, or 
political opinion. Thus, in Matter of Chang, decided seven years before 
section 601(a) was passed, the BIA held that a man who had alleged that 
his family was persecuted under the OCP did not qualify as a refugee 
under the Refugee Act because the OCP was not, in and of itself, 
“persecutive.”62 By coming to this conclusion, the BIA made it clear that 
in order to qualify under the pre-section 601(a) refugee definition based 
on OCP practices, an alien would not only have to show that he or she 
was the victim of a coercive birth control method, but also that 
enforcement of the OCP was selectively applied against him or her based 
on his or her race, religion, national origin, social group or political 
opinion. With the enactment of section 601(a), however, this all changed. 
Under section 601(a), any direct victim, whether male or female, who 
has been “forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary 
sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo 
such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control 
program,” is automatically deemed to have a well-founded fear of 
  
child policy was applied to him for reasons protected under the Act.”); accord Matter of Chang 20 I. 
& N. Dec. 38, 44 (B.I.A. 1989). In Chang, the judge explained as follows: 
We cannot find that implementation of the “one couple, one child” policy in and of itself, 
even to the extent that involuntary sterilizations may occur, is persecution or creates a 
well-founded fear of persecution “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in 
a particular social group, or political opinion.”  
. . . .  
Thus, an asylum claim based solely on the fact that the applicant is subject to this policy 
must fail. An individual claiming asylum for reasons related to this policy must establish, 
based on additional facts present in his case, that the application of the policy to him was 
in fact persecutive or that he had a well-founded fear that it would be persecutive on 
account of one of the five reasons enumerated in section 101(a)(42)(A).  
Id. 
 61 Memorandum from David A. Martin, Gen. Counsel, Immigration & Naturalization 
Serv., Asylum Based On Coercive Family Planning Policies: Section 601 of the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (Oct. 21, 1996), available at 
http://immigration.com/news/a-family-planning.html. By linking resistance to coercive population 
control practices to political opinion, section 601 of the 1996 Act relieves applicants of the burden of 
demonstrating a nexus between the persecution for their resistance to such practices and a status 
protected under the Refugee Act. Id.  
 62 Matter of Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38, 43 (BIA 1989).  
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persecution on account of his or her “political opinion.”63 By lifting the 
burden on the applicant of proving a nexus between his or her 
persecution and one of the protected categories in the refugee definition, 
section 601(a) is unambiguously intended to provide per se refugee status 
to the direct victims of persecution, or those who have a well-founded 
fear of direct persecution.64 The plain language of the statute, however, is 
seemingly silent as to its intended effect on husbands, fiancés, or 
boyfriends of such persecuted women.65 If the woman who has been 
forced to abort a child can be granted political asylum in the United 
States, then should the man whose child was also aborted, but who did 
not himself have to physically endure the pain of the forced abortion, 
also meet the refugee definition based on this abortion? What about 
where the physically unharmed man comes to the United States while his 
allegedly persecuted partner remains in China? And if this is the case, 
how will an IJ be able to distinguish between genuine and fraudulent 
claims by physically unharmed males who have no evidence at all of the 
persecution allegedly done against their female partners? The series of 
cases discussed below illustrate how the BIA has addressed some of 
these issues and how the different Courts of Appeals have expanded or 
narrowed the BIA’s determinations. 
III.  THE BIA’S DECISION AND THE DIFFERING CIRCUIT COURT 
INTERPRETATIONS OF THAT DECISION 
Before either the BIA or a federal court reviewing the BIA’s 
decision can expand or narrow the plain-meaning of the statute, which 
seemingly only grants relief to the direct victims of persecution, it must 
determine that the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the issue 
at hand—i.e., whether section 601(a) explicitly provides protections for 
indirect partners of the direct persecution victim. This determination of 
silence or ambiguity is required under the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Chevron v. NRDC, which mandates that “[i]f the intent of Congress is 
clear, that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency, 
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”66 
However, if the court finds the statute is silent or ambiguous, then the 
  
 63 IIRIRA § 601(a)(1), 8 U.S.C § 1101 (a)(42)(b) (2006). 
 64 In re X-P-T- was the first BIA case decided under section 601(a). In re X-P-T-, 21 I. 
& N. Dec. 634 (BIA 1996). The BIA held that any alien who had been forced to have an abortion or 
sterilization, or who had been persecuted for other resistance to the OCP, had suffered persecution 
under the “political opinion” status of the original refugee definition, and thus qualified as a refugee. 
Id. at 636.  
 65 For purposes of this Note, it is assumed that the coercive family planning techniques 
(i.e., abortions, IUD insertions, and sterilizations) are being used against women, despite that fact 
that both men and women are subject to forced sterilizations. Thus, the discussions in this Note 
about the refugee status of husbands and unmarried boyfriends/fiancés based on their wives or 
girlfriends’ persecution can apply equally to wives and girlfriends when their husband or 
boyfriend/fiancé is forcefully sterilized.  
 66 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
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federal court, under the second step of Chevron, must defer to the 
agency’s interpretation of the statute, here the BIA’s, “unless [such 
interpretation is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute.”67 In other words, a court should only follow the BIA’s 
interpretation if it finds that such an interpretation constitutes “a 
permissible construction of the statute.”68 Different applications of these 
two Chevron steps have led to the numerous competing interpretations of 
section 601(a) amongst the circuit courts.  
A.  In re C-Y-Z-  
In re C-Y-Z-69 is the seminal BIA case with respect to asylum 
relief under section 601(a), and it is the application of this holding that 
has spawned the conflicting Courts of Appeals’ interpretations of section 
601(a). The asylum applicant in C-Y-Z- was a male Chinese citizen, who 
was legally married in China and who had three children.70 In his 
application he stated that after the birth of his first child government 
officials in China forced his wife to get an IUD insertion.71 After the IUD 
was removed, his wife became pregnant a second time, and this time she 
was ordered to have an abortion.72 She was able to escape the abortion 
only by hiding in a relative’s home.73 When his wife became pregnant a 
third time, she again hid with relatives, but after she gave birth, she was 
sterilized against her will.74 Eighteen months later, the applicant left 
China for the United States.75 When the case was originally brought 
before the Immigration Judge, section 601(a) had not yet been enacted.76 
Therefore, the IJ denied the applicant’s claim relying on Matter of 
Chang’s not-yet-overruled holding that applicants have a burden of 
proving a “nexus” between their persecution under the OCP and one of 
the protected statuses listed in the Refugee Act.77 The IJ noted that “if 
indeed [the applicant’s wife] was forced to undergo an involuntary 
sterilization, [she] did not gain anything from having the applicant 
abandon her and the children for the United States. . . . In effect, the 
applicant seeks to ride on his wife’s coattails.”78 The applicant then 
appealed to the BIA and before the BIA decided the case, section 601(a) 
  
 67 Id. at 844. 
 68 Id. at 843. 
 69 In re C-Y-Z, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915 (BIA 1997). 
 70 Id. at 915. 
 71 Id. at 916. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. To support his claim, the applicant presented copies of his marriage certificate, a 
copy of his wife’s sterilization certificate, his children’s birth certificates, etc. Id. 
 76 Id. at 917. 
 77 Id. at 916-17. 
 78 Id. at 916. 
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was enacted, abolishing the nexus requirement of the Refugee definition 
for those persecuted under coercive population policies.79  
Once the case reached the BIA, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (“INS”) conceded in its appeal brief that, as 
argued by the applicant, the husband of a persecuted wife could “stand in 
[his wife’s] shoes.”80 Nevertheless, the INS argued that any persecution 
that may have occurred to the applicant was over81 and that any possible 
harm did not directly impact the applicant. In rebuttal, the applicant 
argued that because he could stand in this wife’s shoes, he has 
established past persecution.82 Furthermore, because the conditions in 
China with respect to its OCP had remained unchanged, he alleged that 
he continued to have a well-founded fear of future persecution.83 The 
BIA, largely relying on the INS’s concession, agreed with the applicant, 
and ruled that “the applicant has established eligibility for asylum by 
virtue of his wife’s forced sterilization.”84  
A major problem with C-Y-Z-’s holding was the BIA’s lack of 
clarity in explaining its rationale for accepting the INS’s concession and 
the applicant’s argument that a husband can stand in his wife’s shoes for 
purposes of establishing past persecution under section 601(a).85 For 
example, the BIA did not point to any specific language in section 601(a) 
  
 79 Id. at 917. 
 80 Id. at 918 (“The [INS] is aware that its legal perspective as directed by the General 
Counsel is that the husband of a sterilized wife can essentially stand in her shoes and make a bona 
fide and non-frivolous application for asylum based on problems impacting more intimately on her 
than on him.”).  
 81 Id. at 928 (Board Member Filppu’s concurring and dissenting opinion notes that the 
applicant had testified that in the time between his wife’s sterilization and his arrival in the United 
States, which was over 17 months, he had absolutely no problems with the Chinese government).  
 82 Id. at 918. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id.; see also id. at 919 (“In view of the enactment of section 601(a) of the IIRIRA and 
the agreement of the parties that forced sterilization of one spouse . . . is an act of persecution against 
the other spouse, the applicant has established past persecution.”).  
 85 Board Member Filppu recognized this in his separate opinion. He notes that the INS 
brief, which concedes that a wife’s persecution can establish persecution for a husband, fails to set 
forth “the reasoning behind this position on ‘joint spousal persecution.’” Id. at 928. He further 
concludes that husbands should not be granted per se refugee status based on their wife’s 
persecution:  
It seems to me that the infliction of an abortion or sterilization procedure on one spouse 
may or may not lead to the conclusion that the other spouse has been persecuted. For 
example, a couple may jointly want more children and oppose their government’s efforts 
to restrict family size. In these circumstances, the sterilization of one spouse adversely 
affects both . . . . On the other hand, a particular husband might believe the family has 
enough children. He then might not oppose the family’s compliance with a country’s 
population control laws through his wife’s sterilization, even though she may vigorously 
disagree. . . . But it is not self-evident to me why the wife’s sterilization would 
necessarily amount to past persecution of the consenting husband.  
In re C-Y-Z, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 928-29. Additionally, dissenting board member Villageliu stated that 
“my reluctance to join the majority is that I find it implausible that the natural reaction of a husband 
whose wife has been sterilized, and who deems it persecutive, would be to then proceed to the 
United States seeking asylum, leaving her behind.” Id. at 935. 
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that supports this theory. Nor did it explain the scope of its holding. It 
leaves open the question as to whether its holding should apply only to 
legally married husbands, or extend to traditionally married husbands as 
well. Nor does the court speak to whether unmarried partners, such as 
fiancés or boyfriends, can also stand in their female partner’s shoes. 
Thus, while the BIA has the power to interpret section 601(a),86 its bare 
bones reasoning of this case left the door open for the federal circuit 
courts, facing appeals from the BIA, to develop their own interpretations 
of section 601(a) based on their own policy ideas. And indeed, there is a 
big split among the Courts of Appeals as to how broadly the BIA’s 
decision should extend. 
B.  The Ninth Circuit Construes the Holding of C-Y-Z Broadly  
In Ma v. Ashcroft87 the Ninth Circuit interpreted the BIA’s C-Y-
Z- holding broadly.88 Ma, a Chinese citizen, married his wife, Chiu, at 
age nineteen.89 Since Ma was not of legal age to get married under 
China’s Marriage Law, the government refused to legally recognize the 
marriage.90 Thus, even though Ma and Chiu were wed in a traditional 
marriage, Chiu could not legally have a child and any resulting 
pregnancy could be subject to a forced abortion.91 Chiu soon got 
pregnant, and in the third trimester of the pregnancy, she was detained by 
birth control officials and was forced to abort the pregnancy.92 Soon 
  
 86 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2000). Section 1003.1(g) provides:  
Except as Board [i.e., BIA] decisions may be modified or overruled by the Board or the 
Attorney General, decisions of the Board, and decisions of the Attorney General, shall be 
binding on all officers and employees of the Department of Homeland Security or 
immigration judges in the administration of the immigration laws of the United States. By 
majority vote of the permanent Board members, selected decisions of the Board rendered 
by a three-member panel or by the Board en banc may be designated to serve as 
precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues. Selected decisions 
designated by the Board, decisions of the Attorney General, and decisions of the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to the extent authorized in paragraph (i) of this section, 
shall serve as precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues.  
Id.  
 87 361 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2004).  
 88 Id. at 554-55. 
 89 Id. at 555. 
 90 Id.  
 91 Id.  
 92 Id. at 555-56. A more detailed version of the facts is as follows: Ma, no longer wanting 
to live in fear, attempted to register his marriage to Chiu with local authorities. This attempt, 
however, put local officials on notice that Ma and Chiu had violated the OCP, and later word spread 
to officials that Chiu was pregnant. Soon thereafter, five officials came to Ma’s home, wanting to do 
a physical examination on Chiu. However, Chiu, fearing that this would happen, was already hiding 
with relatives in a nearby village. Since the officials could not find Chiu, they instead beat Ma and 
seized Ma’s father, threatening that they would hold the father until Chiu came forward for an 
abortion. When word spread to Chiu that officials were holding Ma’s father, she went to the Family 
Planning Office, begging that he be released. There, Chiu was detained and forced to abort her child. 
After the abortion, Ma and Chiu decided to leave China. Chiu encouraged Ma to go first and send for 
her as soon as possible. Ma thus left China, smuggled in a boat. Id. 
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thereafter, Ma left for the United States with the hope of sending for his 
wife once he got settled.93 Once in the United States, Ma applied for 
asylum,94 specifically alleging persecution on the basis of China’s refusal 
to recognize his marriage and the OCP regulation that forced his wife to 
abort their child.95 The immigration judge granted Ma’s claim, and the 
INS appealed to the BIA.96 
The BIA held that Ma, because of his lack of a legally 
recognized marriage, did not qualify as a “spouse” under its previous 
holding in C-Y-Z-.97 The BIA thus somewhat clarified that its holding 
from C-Y-Z- was a narrow one, something that they had not made clear 
in C-Y-Z- itself. Ma petitioned the BIA to reconsider his case, but the 
Board denied his request,98 determining that its C-Y-Z- holding was 
limited to spouses in legally registered marriages only.99 Ma then 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit where he argued that the BIA’s decision 
denying him asylum was based on an erroneous bright-line distinction 
between legally married couples and traditionally married couples.100 He 
further argued that such a distinction was senseless because only those 
who are too young to marry under China’s Marriage Law, which is itself 
an integral part of the OCP, are in traditional marriages.101  
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Ma.102 It noted:  
The BIA’s refusal to grant asylum to an individual who cannot register his 
marriage with the Chinese government on account of a law promulgated as part 
of its coercive population control policy, a policy deemed by Congress to be 
oppressive and persecutory, contravenes the statute and leads to absurd and 
wholly unacceptable results. Accordingly, we need not defer to the BIA’s 
decision.103  
In other words, the Ninth Circuit did not defer to the BIA’s decision 
because, under the second step of Chevron, it believed that the BIA’s 
limitation of granting relief to “legal,” but not “traditional,” spouses was 
an unreasonable interpretation of section 601(a). The court further noted 
that granting relief only to legal spouses could lead to the absurd result of 
breaking up the family, which would not only be “at odds” with the 
purpose of section 601(a), but also with U.S. immigration policy as a 
  
 93 Id. at 556. 
 94 Id. When the boat in which Ma was being smuggled was intercepted, Ma was put in a 
detention center for a number of years, but eventually applied for asylum. Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 556-57. 
 97 Id. at 557. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 555. 
 101 Id.  
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 559. The Seventh Circuit has followed the Ninth Circuit’s lead in extending 
relief to traditional spouses. Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 999 (7th Cir. 2006) (describing the 
BIA’s bright-line rule between legal spouses and traditional spouses as a “Catch-22”). 
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whole.104 This absurd result could occur, for example, if Chiu was 
granted refugee status based on her forced abortion, while Ma, not 
legally recognized as her husband, would be unable to derivatively 
achieve the same status.105 Finally, the court noted that while in most 
instances it defers to other nations’ minimum marriage ages, it would not 
do so here.106 It reasoned that in light of the enactment of section 601(a) 
to provide relief to OCP victims, and in light of the fact that the 
minimum marriage ages in China are an essential part of the OCP, it 
would avoid such deference because giving it “would contravene the 
fundamental purpose of the statute.”107  
Thus, under the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ma, any spouse, 
whether traditional or legal, qualifies for relief under section 601(a) 
based solely on the persecution of their wife. Note, however, that while 
this holding does not appear to be exceedingly broad, it has left the door 
wide open to the possibility for manipulation and fraudulent claims under 
section 601(a). This is because those who are married in a traditional 
marriage rather than a legal marriage will have no proof of their marriage 
from the Chinese government because the Chinese government has 
rejected the couple’s marriage application.108 It can therefore be quite 
easy for both fiancés and boyfriends of persecuted females to allege that 
they were actually in a traditional marriage with their partner. Even 
beyond fiancés and boyfriends, however, the Ninth Circuit’s holding 
opens the door to the possibility of fraudulent claims. While a “legal” 
spouse should at the least be able to prove that he was legally married 
(by presenting official government documents such as the marriage 
certificate, joint tax returns, joint bank account statements, property 
titles, etc.), and will hopefully have documented evidence of his wife’s 
persecution (medical records showing that she was pregnant at one time, 
etc.), a person claiming to be in a mere traditional marriage is unlikely to 
have many of these documents. Thus, nearly anyone, even males who do 
not even have a partner at all, can, under the Ninth Circuit’s broad 
holding, easily make a fraudulent claim that they now meet the 
requirements of section 601(a). Indeed, as will be discussed below, 
fraudulent asylum claims by Chinese males under section 601(a) have 
recently become quite common.  
  
 104 Ma, 361 F.3d at 561 (“Application of the BIA’s rule would result in the separation of a 
husband and wife, the break-up of a family, a result that is at odds not only with the provision at 
issue here, but also with significant parts of our overall immigration policy.”).  
 105 Id.  
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Note, however, that the couple, in trying to prove that they were wed in a traditional 
marriage ceremony, may actually have proof of the denial of a legal marriage from the Chinese 
government. See Meredith M. Snyder, Note, For Better or Worse: A Discussion of the BIA’s 
Ambiguous C-Y-Z- Decision and its Legacy for Refugees of China’s One Child Policy, 84 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1541, 1543 (2006). 
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C.  The Third Circuit Construes the Holding of C-Y-Z- Narrowly  
Shortly after Ma was decided, the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, unlike the Ninth Circuit, held that it must accord Chevron 
deference to the BIA’s C-Y-Z- holding that per se relief will only be 
granted to those husbands who are legally married to their wives. In 
Chen v. Ashcroft,109 Chen and his girlfriend, Chen Gui, started living 
together when Chen was nineteen years old and Chen Gui was 
eighteen.110 When the couple discovered that Chen Gui was pregnant, 
they applied for a marriage license.111 However, since neither Chen nor 
Chen Gui had reached the minimum age for marriage, the application 
was denied by the Chinese government.112 OCP Officials, receiving word 
of the pregnancy, went to look for Chen Gui.113 Chen Gui was not home, 
and Chen, after getting into a minor physical fight with the officials, was 
told that he had a few days to inform them of her whereabouts, or he 
would be arrested.114 The couple then went into hiding, and Chen soon 
thereafter left for the United States.115 After Chen left, he learned that the 
OCP officials ultimately had found Chen Gui and had forced her to abort 
their baby in the eighth month of the pregnancy.116 When the INS 
initiated removal proceedings against Chen, he sought asylum relief 
under section 601(a).117 Similarly to Ma, Chen argued that although he 
was not legally married, the BIA’s distinction between the status of 
legally married couples and the status of other couples “evinces such a 
lack of rationality as to be [an] arbitrary and capricious” interpretation of 
section 601(a).118 He also claimed that, if not for China’s refusal, he and 
Chen Gui would have been legally married.119 The BIA, however, 
summarily reaffirmed that its C-Y-Z- holding had “not been extended to 
include [legally] unmarried partners.”120 Chen appealed to the Third 
Circuit.121  
The Third Circuit assumed for the sake of argument that 
C-Y-Z-’s interpretation of section 601(a) was permissible under step one 
of Chevron—i.e., that the statute was ambiguous as to its intended relief 
  
 109 381 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 110 Id. at 223.  
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 227. 
 119 Id. at 222. 
 120 Id. at 223. In this case, the IJ who initially heard Chen’s case granted his asylum 
petition. The IJ reasoned that since Chen and Chen Gui would have married if they had been legally 
allowed to, they fell under C-Y-Z-’s holding “by analogy . . . if not by the letter.” The INS then 
appealed to the BIA. Id. 
 121 Id. 
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for physically unharmed partners of persecuted women.122 The court then 
concluded that under the second step of Chevron, it must accord 
deference to the BIA’s limitation because expanding relief to only legal 
spouses of persecuted victims was within the range of permissible 
interpretations of section 601(a).123 The court first reasoned that using 
legal marital status to distinguish those who deserve per se relief from 
those who still must prove the nexus requirement of the refugee 
definition was a simple way to identify those whose opportunities to 
reproduce and raise children were seriously impaired by the wife’s 
forced abortion or sterilization and those who would likely suffer the 
most emotional pain by such persecution.124 Second, the court noted that, 
in light of the BIA’s heavy caseload, it was entirely reasonable for it to 
adopt a position requiring a legal marriage because only legal marriages 
can be proven by documentation.125  
The court further noted that the BIA might have wanted to avoid 
the practical difficulties that would arise if unmarried males had to prove 
paternity of a child that was forcibly aborted and the great potential for 
false claims that would come along with such a difficulty.126 It 
specifically pointed to legislative history of section 601(a) in which some 
legislators appeared concerned “about the ease with which ‘young 
Chinese single-unmarried-males’ might falsely claim eligibility for 
asylum under the proposed amendment, resulting in a flood of meritless 
applications.”127 Finally, the court expressly disagreed with the Ninth 
Circuit’s Ma rationale. It stated: “[W]e see no basis for concluding that 
Congress’s intent in amending [the original refugee definition] was to 
afford relief to every person who is a victim of any rule or practice that 
  
 122 Id. at 227.  
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 227-28. Chen argued that even if it was rational not to extend the C-Y-Z- holding 
to include all unmarried indirect male partners, the holding should at the very least be extended to 
cover those who wanted to marry but were denied a marriage certificate because they did not meet 
the minimum age requirements. However, the Third Circuit rejected this argument as well, noting 
that they must respect the minimum age requirements put in place. The court conceded, however, 
that, “Chen’s situation simply shows that C-Y-Z- is underinclusive with respect to a narrow but 
sympathetic class,” but went on to say that this underinclusiveness is not enough to deem the BIA’s 
interpretation as unreasonable. Id. at 229-30. 
 125 Id. at 229. The court, in further determining that C-Y-Z- was not arbitrary and 
capricious, also pointed to the fact that marital status is used as a proxy in many areas of law—i.e., 
“income tax, welfare benefits, property, inheritance, testimonial privilege, etc.” Id. at 227 n.6.  
 126 Id. at 229 (“The BIA might also have been concerned that unmarried asylum-seekers 
would falsely claim to have had an intimate relationship with a person who suffered a forced 
abortion or sterilization, and the BIA might have felt that it would be too difficult to distinguish 
between those unmarried persons who had a truly close relationship with the person who underwent 
the medical procedure and those unmarried asylum seekers who did not.”).  
 127 Id. at 233 (quoting 142 CONG. REC. S4592 (daily ed. May 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. 
Simpson)). While the Ma court had pointed to legislative intent to show that section 601(a) was 
adopted to provide relief to persecuted “couples” and to prevent the break up of families, Ma v. 
Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting H. R. REP. NO. 104-469(I), at 174 (1996)), the 
Chen court points to legislative history of fraudulent claims under section 601(a). Chen v. Ashcroft, 
381 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir. 2004).  
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forms a part of the Chinese population control program.”128 The court 
therefore concluded that “the BIA’s interest in promoting 
administrability and verifiability” was sufficient to meet the low burden 
of reasonableness under the second step of Chevron,129 and that it was 
therefore compelled to rule in line with C-Y-Z-. 
D. The Second Circuit Disagrees with C-Y-Z-’s Holding  
With this circuit split firmly in place, in July 2007 the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit took an entirely different approach to the 
interpretation question, further adding to the confusion of the scope of 
section 601(a). The Second Circuit was faced with the three appeals of 
Lin, Dong, and Zou.130 Each of these refugee applicants was a legally 
unmarried male Chinese citizen who alleged that he should qualify as a 
refugee under section 601(a) on account of his partner’s persecution.131 
As expected, the BIA denied each of their asylum claims, finding that its 
holding in C-Y-Z- did not extend to non-legally married spouses.132 On 
appeal, the Second Circuit, rather than assuming that section 601(a) was 
silent or ambiguous with respect to indirect victims of persecution (as the 
Third Circuit had done in Chen)—an interpretation that would permit the 
BIA to “fill in the gap” under step two of Chevron—remanded the case 
to the BIA.133 The purpose of the remand was to give the BIA an 
opportunity to explain how it read section 601(a) to grant per se relief to 
indirect partners of direct victims at all, and further, to clarify its 
reasoning for extending such relief to legal spouses only.134 On remand, 
  
 128 Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 232 (3d Cir. 2004). The court discussed that since the 
asylum statute clearly limits relief only if the harm amounts to a level of “persecution” (with only 
abortions and sterilizations automatically meeting that requirement), then it necessarily excludes 
lesser harms (i.e., being in a minor fight, getting a fine, or losing your job) even if those harms 
implicate humanitarian interests for which the statute was passed. Id. at 231-33.  
 129 Id. at 229.  
 130 Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 296 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 131 Id. at 299. Specifically, Lin alleged that he and his girlfriend were denied 
governmental permission to marry and have a child because his girlfriend was below the minimum 
marriage age. Id. at 301. When his girlfriend got pregnant and was forced to have an abortion, Lin 
left for the United States. His girlfriend was not well enough to travel so she stayed behind in China. 
Petitioner Dong, when detained in the United States, claimed that his fiancée (who was still in 
China) had been forced to have two abortions. Petitioner Zou, who was too young to marry his 
girlfriend, claimed that his girlfriend had been forced to undergo an abortion. Id. 
 132 Id. at 299. 
 133 Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 134 Id. The Second Circuit stated that the because the BIA had failed  
to articulate a reasoned basis for making [legal] spouses eligible for asylum under 
IIRIRA § 601(a), IJs cannot possibly advance principled—let alone persuasive—reasons 
to distinguish between, on the one hand, the BIA’s decision to create spousal eligibility 
under IIRIRA § 601(a), and, on the other hand, the eligibility of boyfriends and fiancés 
under that same statutory provision. 
Id. at 191. Indeed, “a fresh look at C-Y-Z- reveals that the BIA never adequately explained how or 
why, in the first instance, it construed IIRIRA § 601(a) to permit spouses of those directly victimized 
by coercive family planning policies to become eligible for asylum themselves.” Id. With no basis 
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the BIA affirmed its C-Y-Z- position.135 It also clarified that only those 
legal spouses who actually opposed their wife’s persecution should 
qualify under the statute.136 However, it once again failed to specifically 
point to any text of section 601(a) to support this reading, and instead 
pointed merely to the “overall purpose of the amendment” for its 
conclusion that both partners of a legal marriage deserved protection 
under section 601(a) rather than only the direct victims of the 
persecution.137  
The Second Circuit then ordered a rehearing of the petitioners 
cases to consider two particular issues: (1) whether section 601(a)’s 
language is ambiguous so as to allow the BIA to determine its effect on 
partners of direct victims, and (2) if section 601(a) is ambiguous, was C-
Y-Z-’s bright-line rule between legal marriages and traditional marriages 
or other relationships a reasonable construction of the statute.138 With 
respect to the first issue, the Second Circuit examined the language of 
section 601(a) itself to determine whether Congress, through the statute, 
had directly and unambiguously spoken as to its intended effect on 
indirect victims.139 The court determined the language to be unambiguous 
in not extending per se refugee status to anyone beyond the direct 
victim.140 Since section 601(a) refers to “a person who has been forced to 
abort a pregnancy,”141 “a person who had been forced . . . to undergo an 
involuntary sterilization,”142 “a person” who “has been persecuted for 
  
given by the BIA, the Second Circuit stated that it would be “impossible” to make a reasoned 
decision as to whether it should affirm or reverse the petitioners’ cases. Id. 
 135 In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1., Interim Decision (BIA) 2006 WL 3337624 (BIA), at 
*4. In order to come to such a conclusion, the BIA necessarily had to first determine that section 
601(a) was unclear as to the scope of its protections for indirect victims and thus the BIA had the 
power to fill this gap, as it did in fact conclude. Id. Having concluded that the statute was silent, the 
BIA looked at “the focus of the amendment and the legislative history” in order to justify its C-Y-Z- 
holding. Id. Focusing on policy considerations, the BIA noted the responsibilities with respect to 
family planning that legally married couples share. Id. at *6. Once again, it stopped short of 
extending automatic relief to non-legally married partners because “the sanctity of marriage and the 
long term commitment reflected by marriage place the husband in a distinctly different position from 
that of an unmarried father.” Id. at *9. The BIA also noted that C-Y-Z- was already a ten-year-old 
precedent. Id. at *4. Board Member Pauley concurred, but stated that had the BIA been “writing on a 
clean slate,” he would have opted for a case-by-case approach of whether the indirect partner had 
been persecuted for other resistance to a coercive OCP practice rather than granting legally married 
spouses per se relief. Id. at *13. Board Member’s Filppu and Cole dissented, reasoning that section 
601(a) was unambiguous in that is used the words “a person” rather than “a couple.” Id. at *16. 
 136 Id. at *4. 
 137 Id. at *8.  
 138 Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 299-300 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 139 Id. at 305-06. 
 140 Id. at 304-07 (“We conclude that Congress has spoken to this issue and that it has done 
so unambiguously.”). The Second Circuit noted that in previous cases it had deferred to the BIA’s 
holding without ever doing a Chevron analysis. Id. at 305. For example, in Yuan v. U.S. Department 
of Justice, although the court noted that “[b]y its plain language, the law would seem to extend 
refugee status only to actual victims of persecution—for example, a woman who was ‘forced to 
abort a pregnancy,’ but not her husband,” it nevertheless “followed the lead of the BIA.” 416 F.3d 
192, 196 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 141 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 142 Id. (emphasis added).  
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failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure,”143 and “a person who has 
a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo [such a 
procedure],”144 rather than stating “a married couple who has been 
subjected to a forced abortion or involuntary sterilization”145 or 
something analogous, the Second Circuit concluded that Congress did 
not intend to extend per se relief beyond the direct victim.146 Consistent 
with the interpretive principle that “the inclusion of some obviously 
results in the exclusion of others,” the court also reasoned that, because 
section 601(a) specifically mentioned some people (e.g. those who 
directly undergo, fear, or resist abortions or sterilizations), it would be 
unreasonable to read it so as to apply to others.147 Because it concluded 
that the statute was unambiguous with respect to indirect victims in its 
application, the court did not need to reach the second issue of whether 
or not the BIA’s bright-line rule was a reasonable interpretation of the 
statute.148  
Under the Second Circuit’s approach, a male can only qualify for 
asylum relief under section 601(a) if he demonstrates that he himself has 
been sterilized or can show “other resistance149 to a coercive population 
control program” or “a well founded fear that he . . . will be . . . subject 
  
 143 Id. (emphasis added). The court noted that the natural meaning of “undergo” means 
submitting to a procedure that affects your own body, not anyone else’s. Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
494 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).  
 144 8 U.S.C § 1101 (a)(42)(B) (emphasis added). 
 145 Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Had Congress 
intended this clause to refer to a spouse or partner of someone who has been physically subjected to 
a forced procedure, it could simple have said so.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 146 Id. at 304.  
 147 Id. at 307. The court noted that the “critical defect in the BIA’s policy of according per 
se refugee status to spouses of individuals explicitly protected by § 601(a) is its creation of an 
irrebuttable presumption of refugee status for a new class of persons.” Id. at 308. The court further 
noted that if its conclusion is contrary to Congress’s intentions, Congress could, of course, amend 
the statute. Id. at 309 n.10. 
 148 Id. at 309. Nevertheless, some would argue that the mere existence of the previous 
circuit split, and the numerous circuit courts who concluded that section 601(a) was ambiguous, is 
proof enough to contradict the Second Circuit’s finding that section 601(a) is unambiguous as to its 
treatment of indirect partners of physically harmed victims. See Katherine F. Riordan, Comment, 
Withholding Automatic Asylum for Spouses or Partners of Victims of China’s Coercive Family-
Planning Policies: Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296 (2d. Cir. 2007), 41 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 983, 989-90 (2008).  
 149 The Second Circuit admits that what is required under the phrase “other resistance” is 
ambiguous and thus subject to a reasonable BIA interpretation. Lin, 494 F.3d at 312. In In re S-L-L-, 
the BIA held that to show “other resistance,” an applicant must demonstrate both resistance to 
coercive OCP practices and that he or she has suffered based on such resistance. In re S-L-L-, 24 I. 
& N. Dec. 1, at 10, Interim Decision (BIA) 2006 WL 3337624 (BIA). The fact that the person’s 
spouse has been the victim of a coercive OCP practice could play into this analysis, but, standing 
alone, would not be enough to let the person automatically satisfy the “other resistance” language. 
Lin, 494 F.3d at 313. An example of “other resistance” besides a forced abortion or sterilization that 
might rise to the level of persecution so as to fall under section 601(a) would be extreme economic 
sanctions or penalties imposed based on the female’s refusal to abort a child. Karen Y. Crabbs, 
United States Domestic Policies and Chinese Immigrants: Where Should Judges Draw the Line 
When Granting Political Asylum?, 7 FLA. J. INT’L L. 249, 271-72 (1992).  
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to persecution for such . . . resistance.”150 Alternatively, an indirect 
claimant can gain derivative asylum if his spouse has already applied 
and qualified for asylum based on her direct persecution.151 And, of 
course, the alien can always try to meet the traditional nexus requirement 
of the refugee definition. The Supreme Court denied certiorari of the 
claimants in this case,152 thus leaving the three contrasting approaches of 
the Courts of Appeals in place.  
IV.  DECIPHERING THE FUTURE  
A.  The Problem: The Effect of the Case Law on Section 601(a) 
Usage 
The inconsistent application of the statute among the circuits and 
specifically the broad interpretation followed by the Ninth Circuit153 has 
raised serious doubt as to whether section 601(a) sufficiently serves those 
for whom it was primarily implemented to protect and who most 
urgently and deservingly need its protections—direct female victims of 
OCP policies and the victims’ families. When section 601(a) was written 
in 1996, there were two major concerns raised regarding its enactment. 
The first was a serious fear that it would open the floodgates to meritless 
claims by large numbers of Chinese citizens in general. This concern 
stemmed from the fact that coercive OCP enforcement techniques are 
used throughout the vast majority of China’s provinces,154 with millions 
  
 150 Lin, 494 F.3d at 314 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)). The court did not find stare 
decisis to be a valid reason to continue to follow an interpretation of the statute that was inconsistent 
with its plain language. Id. at 310. Nor would the court, given the clarity of the statute, use 
legislative history to help determine its correct interpretation. Id. However, the court noted that there 
was legislative history to support its holding. For example, it pointed to a House Report that stated:  
The Committee is aware that asylum claims based on coercive family planning are often 
made by entire groups of smuggled aliens, thus suggested that at least some of these 
claims, if not the majority, have been ‘coached.’ Section [601(a)] is not intended to 
protect persons who have not actually been subjected to coercive measures or 
specifically threatened with such measures. 
Id. at 310-11 (quoting H.R. REP. 104-469, pt. 1, at 174 (1996) (alterations and emphasis by the 
Second Circuit)).  
 151 Id. at 312. Under 8 U.S.C § 1158(b)(3)(A), “a spouse . . . of an alien who is granted 
asylum . . . may, if not otherwise eligible for asylum, . . . be [automatically] granted the same status 
as the alien if accompanying, or following to join, such alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A). The court 
noted that such a policy of granting the direct victim asylum first, and then derivatively allowing a 
spouse to do so, not only encourages the preservation of the family unit, but also eliminates the 
perverse incentive of encouraging husbands to leave their wives. Lin, 494 F.3d at 312. 
 152  Zhen Hua Dong v. Dep’t of Justice, 128 S. Ct. 2472 (2008).  
 153  The Fifth Circuit has followed the Ninth’s Circuit broad approach. Chen v. Gonzales, 
457 F.3d 670, 674 (“[W]e have joined the Ninth Circuit in extending protections to spouses in cases 
‘[w]here a traditional marriage ceremony has taken place . . . .’” (quoting Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 
F.3d 993, 999 (7th Cir. 2006) (alteration in original))).  
 154 Hunker, supra note 6, at 146 (“Arguably, every alien fleeing China could claim 
refugee status under section 601 because the practice of coercive population control permeates most 
areas of the country.”).  
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of people being exposed to the practices in their lifetimes.155 To alleviate 
this concern, Congress initially enacted a one-thousand-per-fiscal-year 
cap on the number of people who could qualify for asylum under the 
statute.156 Even though the one-thousand-per-year cap was repealed in 
2005,157 the United States has not experienced the feared “flood” of 
Chinese refugees,158 which has alleviated the initial fear that this would 
occur.159 The second concern was that section 601(a) was gender-biased 
in that males would have a harder time than females claiming asylum 
under the statute.160 However, this concern does not logically recognize 
that the statute should more readily apply to women than men because 
state population policies, including China’s, most frequently target 
women.161 For example, women in China are subjected to forced 
sterilizations more often than men, despite the fact that both genders are 
potentially subject to such a procedure capable of having such a 
procedure.162 As a result, between 1979 and 1984, thirty-one million 
women received forced sterilizations while only163 9.3 million men did.164 
This large differential in treatment can be explained in part because some 
people in China believe that vasectomies make men weak.165 In addition, 
  
 155 Id. at 134; see also Rivera, supra note 21, at 259 (“One hundred million—that is the 
number of couples that the Chinese government had prevented from having a child as of 1993.”); 
Patricia Wen, Law Offers Chinese a Path to US, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 18, 2002, at B1 (“If these 
asylum cases work so easily, millions of Chinese would qualify [for asylum] based on the one-child 
policy.” (quoting Chinese immigrant Dong-Sheng Zang)).  
 156 The statute read, “For any fiscal year, not more than a total of 1,000 refugees may 
be . . . granted asylum . . . pursuant to a determination under the third sentence of section 
101(a)(42),” which discusses persecution under China’s OCP. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(5); see Chen v. 
Ashcroft, 381 F. 3d 221, 225 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004). Once the 1000 limit was surpassed in any given 
year, the INS would begin to issue asylum claimants conditional grants. In practice, it would usually 
take up to seven years before the receiver of such a conditional grant would get the full benefits of 
asylum. Furthermore, it usually took another sixteen years before the claimant would be able to 
receive the status of a legal permanent resident. Jordan, supra note 59, at 230-31.  
 157 Jordan, supra note 59, at 231.  
 158 Hunker, supra note 6, at 147. 
 159 The number of asylum claimants from China has slowly increased from 4913 new 
claims a year for fiscal year 1998 to 7934 new claims a year for fiscal year 2007, with Chinese 
applicants making up only 6.9% of all asylee applicants that year. United States Dep’t of Justice, 
Electronic Reading Room Information, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/foiafreq.htm 
(follow 1998 and 2007 hyperlinks under “Statistics, Publications, and Manuals”). Additionally, 
although there are no statistics, it is clear that not every Chinese alien who applies for asylum in the 
United States is doing so based on persecution under the OCP.  
 160 Jordan, supra note 59, at 240 (“[T]here was early criticism that the amendment was 
gender-biased because it would be easier for a female to claim asylum under the amended definition 
based on a forced abortion than it would be for the father of an aborted baby to claim asylum.”).  
 161 Abrams, supra note 55, at 889.  
 162 Ellen Keng, Note, Population Control Through the One-Child Policy in China: Its 
Effects on Women, 18 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 205, 209 (1997). 
 163 I do not use the word “only” here to intend that 9.3 million is a small number. I use the 
word merely to demonstrate that 9.3 million is comparatively smaller than 31 million.  
 164 Jason D. Lazarus, Note, Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery: An Illustration of the Need for a 
Change in the United States’ Immigration Laws to Provide Appropriate Consideration of Asylum 
Claims by Chinese Nationals Fleeing China’s Coercive Population Control, 5 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & 
POL’Y 65, 70 n.34 (1995).  
 165 Kung, supra note 1, at 1312.  
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only women are subject to other coercive techniques such as forced 
abortions and IUD insertions. Therefore, the statute logically should be 
written with broader protection for women than for men. In spite of the 
greater necessity for women to be protected under the statute, the 
perceived gender-bias concern was partially removed in 1989 by the 
BIA’s decision in C-Y-Z- making it much easier for legally married male 
partners to come within the protections of the statute.166 This perceived 
concern was further alleviated with the decision from the Ninth Circuit in 
Ma, which extended relief to the male spouses of persecuted women in 
traditional marriages.167  
With the implementation of such decisions, however, a new 
problem has arisen that is in striking contrast to the initial concern of 
male-gender bias. This new problem is that, while most OCP victims are 
women, section 601(a) is being overwhelmingly used by men to gain 
asylum in the United States.168 In fact, those in the field of immigration 
have commented that “the little-known provision of US immigration law 
. . . has become a quick way into the country for thousands of Chinese 
citizens—three-quarters of them men.”169 The concern has shifted from a 
general fear of “floodgates” and male gender-bias, into a fear of 
specificity that section 601(a) has, in particular, opened the floodgates 
for Chinese males seeking asylum in the United States by way of false 
coercive population control claims.170  
The fact that three-fourths of those using section 601(a) are male 
is not a problem in and of itself. Indeed, there are a number of 
completely reasonable explanations for such a phenomenon. One 
explanation is that men who have been directly persecuted through 
forced sterilizations might be more likely to leave their families and 
homeland than females who have been directly persecuted. This can be 
explained in part by the harsh travel conditions that most migrants have 
to endure to get to the U.S.—a journey a male might be more willing to 
face.171 Additionally, women will often remain in China, despite 
  
 166 In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915 (BIA 1997).  
 167 Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 168 Wen, supra note 155 (“But the law intended to shelter Chinese women has largely 
benefited Chinese men.”); Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims 
of Women, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 625, 629 n.16 (1993).  
 169 Wen, supra note 155 (“Of the 10,000 Chinese people who have obtained political 
asylum based on China’s one-child policy, federal statistics show, three out of four are men.”).  
 170 Moshe S. Berman, Note, The Appropriate Response of the United States to Forced 
Abortion in China: Should Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA be Extended to Allow Asylum for Unmarried 
Couples?, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 339, 352 n.104 (2006-2007) (“[I]f this amendment . . . were to come 
to pass . . . I suggest that there will be millions of people who, under this language, will qualify.” 
(quoting Senator Simpson)); see also Rabkin, supra note 16, at 975. 
 171 Rosenthal, supra note 3 (reporting that the traveling “at best involve[s] flying through 
a series of countries with forged travel documents and at worst mean[s] crossing borders on foot or 
packed in airless trucks, disguised as tomatoes”); see also Kung, supra note 1, at 1275 (“Lured by 
the prospect of a richer life in the United States, Chinese emigrants may endure treacherous journeys 
by air, sea and land in abhorrent conditions . . . .”).  
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persecution, because they feel obligated to tend to their familial duties.172 
A second possibility is that, where the male has not been directly 
persecuted but his female partner has been, it is common for the man to 
come to the United States prior to the female spouse or partner in order 
to secure a job.173 Once settled, the males will then, theoretically, seek to 
have their partners and children join them.174 Indeed, such a practice has 
been in place for decades and is reflected in the Ma case above where Ma 
left China before his wife and alleged that he hoped to send for her 
shortly thereafter.175  
While these explanations are plausible and help justify the 
discrepancy in section 601(a)’s gender usage to some extent, fraud 
undeniably also plays a major part in the equation. Some Chinese men 
are undoubtedly using stories of partner persecution as mere pretext to 
gain refugee status in the United States. While a male migrant may be 
hesitant to falsely claim that the Chinese government forced him to be 
sterilized for fear that a medical examination could reveal the truth, he 
would likely be more willing to falsely claim persecution based on the 
persecution of his legal or traditional wife. While a claim of indirect 
persecution might be enough to qualify the man under the “other 
resistance” clause of section 601(a), the applicant faces a greater 
probability of denial using that route instead of the stand-in-the-shoes-of-
his-partner route.176 This is true because the BIA continues to hold that 
“generally harsh conditions shared by many others do not [rise to a level 
of other resistance] persecution, even where a policy may be repugnant 
to our concepts of freedom.”177 Thus, it appears that a male applicant’s 
best chance of qualifying as a refugee where he has not been directly 
persecuted (sterilized) under OCP practices is to claim that his female 
partner has been directly persecuted. 
  
 172 Abrams, supra note 55, at 904 (“The husbands and fathers escape persecution, while 
women often remain to tend to family responsibilities.”).  
 173 Wen, supra note 155 (reporting that Nancy Kelly, an immigration specialist, argues 
that “families send the men out first so they can get a job, then try to get the rest of the family 
over”); see also Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 556 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Chiu encouraged Ma to leave 
for America first and then to send for her as soon as possible.”); Abrams, supra note 55, at 904 
(“[W]omen often lack the economic independence to escape oppressive conditions.”).  
 174 Wen, supra note 155; see also Ma, 361 F.3d at 556; In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 
927 (BIA 1997) (Rosenberg, concurring) (“The fact that the respondent preceded his family is no 
different from the cultural practice followed by hundreds of thousands of immigrants and refugees 
who fled anti-Semitic pogroms in czarist Russia, famine in Ireland, fascism in Germany, political or 
religious upheaval in other European countries, and civil war and death squads in Central 
America.”); Rabkin, supra note 16, at 993 (noting that families escaping civil wars, famine, and 
religious persecution have for many years sent the male over first to get established before bringing 
over the rest of their family); Rosenthal, supra note 3 (where a woman living in a town known as 
“widow’s village” because most of the husbands left for the United States, says, “Of course I plan to 
go join my husband”).  
 175 Ma, 361 F.3d at 556.  
 176 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.  
 177 Abrams, supra note 55, at 901 & n.123 (referring to the BIA’s decision in In re Acosta, 
19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985)).  
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The case law interpreting the statute, with the exception of the 
recent Second Circuit holding in Lin, affords men who would otherwise 
have to meet the nexus requirement of the traditional refugee definition a 
less complicated path to asylum. So long as the claimant appears 
credible, his own testimony may well be enough for him to gain 
asylum.178 With documentation being scarce in even legitimate refugee 
cases, a lack of a marriage certificate from the Chinese government will 
not necessarily be enough to dispose of the claim.179 Furthermore, since 
even in legitimate cases it is common for a male to come to the United 
States before his female partner, oftentimes the female will not be 
available to undergo a medical examination or to test her credibility. 
Thus, the IJ will likely have nothing to help guide his asylum decision 
except for a credibility determination of the physically unharmed male 
applicant’s story. It is for these reasons that Merle Goodman, a professor 
of Chinese history, has noted that “[t]he potential for abuse [under 
Section 601(a)] is huge.”180 
Unfortunately, this cynical view of fraudulent claims as the 
explanation for why so many men are using section 601(a) is not without 
merit. In fact, while there is no way to know exact numbers, there are 
many documented cases of Chinese asylum seekers presenting claims 
that are later found to be fraudulent.181 The easier it is to make a claim 
under section 601(a), the higher the likelihood is that an alien wanting to 
  
 178 See In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 723 (BIA 1997) (“[A]n alien’s own testimony 
may in some cases be the only evidence available, and it can suffice where the testimony is 
believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of the 
basis of the alien’s alleged fear.”); see also John R.B. Palmer, The Second Circuit’s “New Asylum 
Seekers”: Responses to an Expanded Immigration Docket, 55 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 965, 984 (2006) 
(discussing the fact that, if a person is deemed credible, a lack of corroborating evidence will not be 
a valid reason to deny an asylum claim unless the Immigration Judge can explain why there should 
be corroborating evidence, and that the applicant’s explanation as to why he does not have such 
evidence is insufficient); Rabkin, supra note 16, at 975 (“For the same reason, the House Committee 
emphasized that the success of a claim under section 601(a) would continue to depend on the 
credibility of the asylum-seeker.”). Such a situation (where an IJ would deny a credible Chinese 
person asylum based on his lack of corroborative evidence), however, would likely be rare, because 
oftentimes even legitimate asylum-seekers lack any type of documentation of persecution.  
 179 See Palmer, supra note 178, at 983 (“[A] genuine refugee does not flee her native 
country armed with affidavits, expert witnesses, and extensive documentation.” (quoting Abankwah 
v. INS, 185 F.3d 18, 26 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 180 Wen, supra note 155. Merle Goodman is a professor and a researcher for Harvard 
University’s Fairbank Center for East Asian Research. Id. But note that later in the article, Shen-Shin 
Lu, a Boston lawyer, says that “[w]hile there’s room for abuse in these asylum cases, . . . many 
Chinese men are forced to be sterilized after having one child, so it’s not unreasonable for men to 
directly appeal for asylum based on the one-child policy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Dong-Shen Zang, a Harvard student and Chinese immigrant, noted that he thinks many Chinese 
citizens would be embarrassed to seek asylum relief based upon a fabrication of persecution, 
knowing that such a claim would be a manipulation of the statute and the U.S. immigration system. 
Rather, he states that most Chinese immigrants will either enroll in school, get a job, or get 
sponsored by other relatives already living in the United States, and only then will they seek 
permanent residency. Id. 
 181 Palmer, supra note 178, at 992 (“It is not that the administrators have no grounds to be 
skeptical. Many of today’s asylum seekers do present fraudulent claims.”).  
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come to the United States might take advantage of the “loophole.”182 This 
fear of fraudulent claims is exacerbated “when high-volume law offices 
and ‘travel agencies’ end up standardizing peoples’ stories so that they 
can churn out large quantities of cookie-cutter filings.”183 Thus, when a 
Chinese applicant is defending against a removal proceeding, there are 
known places where he can go to quickly and cheaply obtain help. These 
agencies are able to provide these quick and inexpensive services to the 
applicant, however, only by using a somewhat standardized story for all 
section 601(a) applicants, with many stories based on the female 
partner’s persecution under China’s OCP.184 Similarly, “snakeheads,” 
who are in charge of human trafficking rings in China,185 are known for 
frequently coaching males they smuggle into the United States to 
memorize tales of the persecution that their partners faced under the 
  
 182 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th 
Cong. (2001) (statement of Dan Stein, Executive Director, Federation for American Immigration 
Reform), available at http://www.mnforsustain.org/stein_d_asylum_policy_fair_may_2001.htm 
(“The invitation for false claims is compounded by the now unmanageably broad definitions of who 
is an asylee.”).  
 183 Palmer, supra note 178, at 980; see also Susan Sachs, Cracks in Façade of Refuge; 
Documentary Shows Pitfalls in Process of Seeking Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1999, at A53 
(discussing a documentary called Well-Founded Fear that gives a behind-the-scenes look at the 
asylum process in New York). The documentary in Sachs’s article tells the story of “[a] Chinese 
man follow[ing] the instructions of the smuggler who brought him to the United States and concocts 
an improbable story of fleeing his country’s one-child policy.” It also reports that in the view of 
some long-time asylum interviewers, most of the stories told by applicants are contrived and thus the 
interviewers oftentimes have to rely on nothing more than their “gut feelings” in determining 
whether to approve the application. The documentary further tells of many interviewers resentment 
over being lied to and shows one interviewer, Jim, who mutters, “Oh, another Chinese” and who 
later rolls his eyes when the person cannot get his story straight. Id. 
 184 See supra note 2, and accompanying text; see also Matt Hayes, Corrupt Lawyers Aid 
Immigration Woes, FOXNEWS.COM, Apr. 29, 2002, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,72149,00.html. 
Hayes writes,  
For most lawyers, the practice of immigration law is attractive simply because there are 
so many immigrants. There are over 100,000 new political asylum cases each year alone. 
But this volume also drives down rates and makes the lawyer less than diligent in 
assessing the credibility of his client’s asylum claims. To be too diligent could mean one 
less fee. 
Id. 
 185 Those who are in charge of Chinese human smuggling are called snakeheads. The 
snakehead system is quite a complex one: “Big snakeheads” control networks of “small 
snakeheads,” debt collectors, and enforcers. The small snakeheads are generally local Chinese 
people and are in charge of recruiting people to be smuggled and for collecting down payments from 
them. Once the down-payment is paid, middlemen guide the migrants from one point to the next and 
enforcers are in charge of controlling the people as they are en route to the United States. Once 
arrived, the migrants are locked in safe-houses until their fees are paid. Kung, supra note 1, at 1274. 
Lured by the American dream, experts have estimated that each year snakeheads smuggle 
approximately 50,000 Chinese citizens into the United States. Id. at 1273 & n.12, 1275 (noting that 
estimates range from 10,000 a year and that such human trade is big business, yielding an estimated 
$3 billion a year, with each migrant usually paying between $30,000 and $60,000 for his trip). The 
reason so many Chinese turn to this path is that it is very difficult for the average Chinese citizen to 
get a passport (which they must apply for), a visa from the U.S. embassy in Beijing, and an exit 
permit, all of which are required to travel abroad. Snakeheads, for a hefty price, will procure fake 
copies of these needed documents. Documents in hand, the migrants will travel by land, sea, or air, 
often in horrible conditions, on journeys that can be months long. Id. at 1278-81. “[M]any don’t 
survive the journey.” Hayes, supra note 184.  
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OCP, even when no such persecution ever took place.186 Thus, these 
aliens will be prepared with their story of persecution if they are ever 
caught. In addition to verbal fabrication of persecution stories, human 
smuggling by snakeheads oftentimes involves false documents.187 A 1998 
State Department Report found that in certain areas of China, 
documentation “is subject to widespread fabrication and fraud.”188 
Authentic-looking marriage certificates can easily be printed to add 
credibility to a male’s claim that his “legal” spouse has been persecuted. 
And, even if an immigration officer discovers the documents as false, the 
applicant can then simply tell his coached story of his partner’s 
persecution and hope that his credibility has not been too damaged by 
way of the false documents to warrant an adverse asylum determination 
by the official.189 Section 601(a) thus acts as a safety net—if the migrant 
is not caught, he will be safe, and, if he is caught, he can simply give his 
false documents or tell his oftentimes-false memorized story to be 
granted asylum relief.  
Despite the fact that asylum officers know such fraud is taking 
place, and perhaps even frequently so, the “overwhelming majority” of 
asylum claims under section 601(a), most of which are made by males, 
are granted.190 Asylum officers are required to determine credibility by 
“elicit[ing] detailed testimony about the applicant’s past experiences, 
comparing the applicant’s live testimony with prior statements, 
examining any documentary evidence provided by the applicant, and 
considering any other relevant information [about] conditions in the 
applicant’s home country, region, or town.”191 Asylum officers who have 
no access to information, especially at the point of entry, are sympathetic 
to plausible stories of Chinese men who claim their Government 
persecuted their wives, for there is nothing to possibly contradict their 
stories. For example, one supervisor at O’Hare airport in Chicago stated, 
  
 186 Rabkin, supra note 16, at 992 (discussing how opponents of broadening section 601(a) 
often cite “the frequency with which snakeheads coach the people they smuggle into the United 
States to say they are victims of coercive family planning”); see also Kung, supra note 1, at 1273 
(noting that China “is a major source of smuggled migrants”).  
 187 Palmer, supra note 178, at 995 (noting that “[t]o the extent that [State Department] 
reports are accurate, it would not be illogical to conclude that any given group of Chinese asylum 
seekers may be carrying a higher than average proportion of fraudulent documents”).  
 188 Xiu Ling Zhang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 150, 157 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing the judge’s 
possible reliance on this report); see also Palmer, supra note 178, at 995 n.208.  
 189 Kung, supra note 1, at 1289 (noting that INS officials are trained to detect such fake 
passports and visas).  
 190 Sperry, supra note 3 (discussing how, after LAX starting cracking down on 
undocumented Chinese nationals, O’Hare had a huge influx, where they know the longest they will 
be held is two weeks); see also Wen, supra note 155. But Wen notes that immigration officials may 
well have started cracking down—while only 52 asylum requests under section 601(a) were denied 
in 1998, 324 were denied in 2000. Id.  
 191 Memorandum from Office of Gen. Counsel, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 
Asylum Based On Coercive Family Planning Policies: Section 601 of the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (Oct. 21, 1996), available at 
http://immigration.com/news/a-family-planning.html.  
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“We’re letting these people in even though we really have no idea who 
they are . . . . It’s almost impossible to get any information or any kind of 
background checks from our embassy in Beijing.”192 And later the 
supervisor said, “We’re getting a lot of men who say their wife is 
pregnant with their second child, . . . [b]ut when we ask where their wife 
is, they say she’s back in China.”193 Relying on asylum officers as a 
means of separating honest and fraudulent cases, circuit courts that have 
granted per se relief to spouses under section 601(a) have opened the 
door to new issues of fraud. 194 In fact, the sheer number of false claims 
can hurt asylum-seekers with legitimate claims as immigration officials 
start to become more and more skeptical of anyone claiming asylum 
under section 601(a).195 With snakeheads and “travel agents” coaching 
Chinese male migrants to exploit the ease with which males are granted 
political asylum under section 601(a), and with courts struggling to find 
the proper balance for letting in those with legitimate claims while 
keeping undeserving aliens out, there is a clearly a need for change.196  
B.  Suggestions to Deter Fraudulent Claims under Section 601(a) 
With respect to the circuit court decisions discussed above, none 
of these holdings are without serious flaws. The Ninth Circuit’s 
expansive approach from Ma, which grants both legal and traditional 
spouses per se relief,197 does nothing to solve the fraud problem. Rather, 
it is these expansive applications of section 601(a) that have been a cause 
of the problem. Additionally, from a policy perspective, in order to 
  
 192 Sperry, supra note 3 (quoting an INS inspections supervisor) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 193 Id. 
 194 Kung, supra note 1, at 1305.  
 195 Id. at 1307. 
 196 Cleo Kung’s Comment about Snakeheads suggests that section 601(a), having 
subjected the already over-burdened U.S. asylum system to the abuses of Chinese smugglers, should 
be completely repealed. He says the statute is redundant in that anyone who is actually persecuted 
under China’s coercive OCP practices would qualify for refugee status under the pre-section 601(a) 
definition of a refugee. However, I believe that such a step is unwise and that there are other possible 
solutions to help limit abuse without going so far as completely repealing the statute. While Kung 
states that anyone who has actually been persecuted under the OCP would qualify as a refugee on 
account of his or her political opinion, he does not explain why, if this is true, the BIA, prior to the 
adoption of section 601(a), had not granted refugee status solely on the basis of OCP persecution. Id. 
at 1306, 1312. In fact, the BIA’s previous failure to grant refugee relief to those persecuted based on 
OCP policies was one of the major motivations for the enactment of section 601(a). See supra notes 
60-62 and accompanying text. Many other commentators on the subject of section 601(a) simply 
argue that the Ninth Circuit’s broad approach to section 601(a) should be more widely adopted, 
pointing to the serious human rights abuses in China and the fact that unmarried male partners whose 
children have been aborted are just as harmed by the coercive act as are legally married male 
spouses. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 170, at 3367-68; Raina Nortick, Note, Singled Out: A 
Proposal to Extend Asylum to the Unmarried Partners of Chinese Nationals Fleeing the One-Child 
Policy, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2183 (2007); Rabkin, supra note 16, at 986. However, these 
suggestions to follow the Ma approach seem to discount the serious U.S. immigration concerns of 
limiting fraudulent claims under section 601(a). See infra Part IV.B.  
 197 Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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follow this approach the United States has to disrespect China’s marriage 
law. While these laws are unquestionably tied to the OCP, they may also 
be necessary to help to diminish China’s population growth—a goal that 
many people agree to be a valid one. While the coercive enforcement 
techniques of the OCP are criticized, the OCP, in general, when done 
with appropriate incentives to follow the OCP rules, may be the only 
way to ensure China’s long-term success.198 The OCP can help to prevent 
serious food shortages, environmental problems, and health problems for 
Chinese citizens. Thus, despite the marriage law being tied to the OCP, 
this alone might not be a legitimate reason for the United States to 
disrespect it, when the law by itself is not physically harmful to the 
Chinese citizens. 
While the Third Circuit’s narrower approach in Chen is a step in 
the right direction, there is still nothing to prevent males in a traditional 
marriage from simply lying and saying they are in a legal marriage.199 
Immigration officials may have a difficult time making an adverse 
credibility determination when most legitimately legally married spouses 
lack documentation of their marriage.200 Additionally, such a system does 
little to help ensure the benefits of U.S. law to those directly persecuted 
under the OCP.  
Thus, from the perspective of trying to reduce fraudulent use of 
section 601(a), if any of the above circuit decisions should be followed at 
all, it should be the Second Circuit’s case-by-case approach from Lin. 
The Lin court has been the only court, to date, to adequately analyze 
section 601(a)’s language prior to ruling. This analysis is in contrast to 
the Third and Ninth Circuits’ analysis, which simply assumed that 
section 601(a) was silent or ambiguous as to its protections for indirect, 
physically unharmed partners. Given the Second Circuit’s detailed 
analysis of the statute’s language, it is the most likely to represent 
Congress’s intended treatment of such partners. For example, Congress’s 
repeated use of the phrase “a person,” rather than “a couple” should not 
be ignored. Additionally, this restrictive interpretation, which denies per 
se relief to any and all indirect victims solely on the basis of their 
partner’s persecution, eliminates the low hurdle that males have faced 
since C-Y-Z-. Reimplementation of the nexus requirement of the Refugee 
Act will raise the burden of proof on the applicant and will thereby 
reduce the number of fraudulent claims attempted and reduce those that 
go undetected. However, a case-by-case approach toward indirect 
  
 198 The OCP has brought the birthrate in China down from 33.43 per thousand people in 
1970 to 21.06 per thousand people in 1990. China’s One Child Policy in 1997, 
http://nhs.needham.k12.ma.us/cur/kane97/P6/eep6/eep6.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2009); see also 
Alister Doyle, China Says One-Child Policy Helps Protect Climate, REUTERS, Aug. 30, 2007, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSL3047203920070830?src=083007_ 
0844_DOUBLEFEATURE_iraq_touts_progress.  
 199 Berman, supra note 170, at 374 (“[P]eople who are willing to lie in order to receive 
asylum would change their story to fit whatever laws are in place to regulate asylum.”). 
 200 Sperry, supra note 3.  
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victims would be time consuming and costly for the BIA. Without a 
bright-line rule, all appeals from IJs to the BIA would have to be 
carefully considered on the merits rather than being summarily decided 
based on the marriage status of the male. The BIA’s caseload has already 
been described as “crushing,” and such a detailed analysis of all indirect 
victims’ claims would only add to this heavy burden.201 
There are a number of other possible strategies that could be 
followed, which are also unlikely to be effective at preventing fraud. One 
such strategy might be to re-implement an annual cap on the number of 
people who can use section 601(a) every year, as existed when section 
601(a) was originally implemented. The number should be set higher 
than the previous one-thousand-per-year cap to reflect the reality that 
today far more than one thousand claimants a year are likely to have 
valid claims under section 601(a). However, the number should also be 
lower than the number of people currently using section 601(a) to limit 
some of the fraudulent claimants from gaining refugee relief. While such 
a strategy would certainly achieve a desired effect of closing the 
floodgates to some extent, there would still be no guarantee at all that 
those being closed out will be the ones with the fraudulent claims. In 
fact, such a cap may serve to deny asylum to people who have legitimate 
claims, which is why the cap was abandoned in the first place.  
A second possible solution would be to require documentation 
of medical examinations and/or marriage certificates so that fraud-
perpetrating males could not simply rely on their coached story, without 
more, to gain refugee status. However, as noted above, documentation 
fraud in China is already widespread.202 Having such a requirement may 
have the perverse effect of encouraging greater documentation fraud. 
Indeed, unscrupulous snakeheads and lawyers may, knowing of such a 
requirement, try to turn a larger profit than they already do by charging 
more for such documents. Moreover, because many refugees quickly flee 
their home country without time to seek out such documents,203 such a 
strategy might also have the unintended consequence of denying 
legitimate section 601(a) claimants refugee status.  
Given the above stated concerns, the best possible solution may 
be to enact a legislative amendment to section 601(a) that implements a 
system of conditional refugee grants to indirect male victims. Such a 
system should be modeled after the regulations put in place by Congress 
to deter immigration based on fraudulent marriages—i.e., marriages 
between aliens and U.S. citizens that are entered into solely for the 
immigration benefits available to the alien based on such a marriage. In 
  
 201 Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 202 Palmer, supra note 178, at 995 (noting that “[t]o the extent that [State Department] 
reports are accurate, it would not be illogical to conclude that any given group of Chinese asylum 
seekers may be carrying a higher than average proportion of fraudulent documents”).  
 203 Id. at 980. 
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1986 Congress passed the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments 
(IMFA) to directly help combat such marriage fraud.204 Although 
marriage fraud undoubtedly occurs on a much grander scale than section 
601(a) fraud, the same principles that are used to deter fraud in the 
former can likewise be used to deter the lesser volume, but no less 
important, fraud under the latter.  
The most important tool put in place by the IMFA amendments 
was its system of conditional grants of lawful permanent residency for 
any alien who obtains lawful permanent resident status based on a 
marriage that is less than two years old.205 This conditional period lasts 
for two years, and ninety days before the two years expires the married 
couple is to jointly petition DHS to “remove” the conditions.206 The 
couple may be called in for an interview at this time in which they must 
once again prove that their marriage is not a sham. If successful, the 
conditions on the alien’s permanent residency will be removed and then 
he or she will have the full benefits of being a lawful permanent 
resident207—including the rights to work or study in the United States, to 
live here indefinitely, to leave and enter the United States as he or she 
pleases, and to later become a citizen of the United States. In general, the 
idea of the marriage fraud amendments is to prevent aliens from gaining 
these benefits based on their marriage to a U.S. citizen if the marriage 
was entered into solely to gain these benefits rather than because the 
couple wanted to build a life together.  
Under the conditional-grant system in the section 601(a) context, 
a per se approach for credible males would be left in place for any 
indirect partners so as to avoid increasing the already heavy caseload on 
the BIA. However, the grant of refugee status would be made conditional 
on the male’s female partner later joining him in the United States, and 
upon the determination that she is actually his partner, and that she was 
actually persecuted as required under section 601(a). This approach 
would conform to the reality that, in many cases, males usually arrive in 
the U.S. first to establish some stability before their families join them.208 
It also recognizes that males should not be too easily rejected, as even in 
legitimate cases of persecution there will often be little evidence. Under 
the proposed system, however, like under the marriage fraud context, the 
indirect male victims would be given a time limit, perhaps two years, 
which is determined to be enough time to become somewhat financially 
secure. At the end of this two-year time-period, the alien’s political 
asylum status would automatically expire, making the alien an illegal 
alien who is subject to removal proceedings. However, ninety days prior 
  
 204 See Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 
3537 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1154, 1184, 1186a (1994)).  
 205 8 U.S.C. § 1186a (2006).  
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 See supra notes 169-171 and accompanying text.  
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to expiration, the male would have the ability to file a petition to remove 
the conditions on his asylum status. The male and his female partner 
would then be interviewed by an immigration officer, during which the 
officer would have the opportunity to review the bona fides of the male 
applicant’s underlying story. The male would have to prove that his 
persecuted female partner has come to the United States, and thus his 
political asylum claim was a legitimate one whose status should be 
continued.209  
With some exceptions, if the female does not join the male by 
the time the male has to petition for continued asylum protections, the 
male’s conditional grant would be revoked on the theory that if the 
female was the one directly persecuted, the male should not be able to 
gain the benefits of asylum based solely on her persecution when she 
does not gain refugee status on those grounds—the male should not be 
allowed to “ride the wife’s coattails”210 while leaving the real or 
imaginary female partner behind in China. Exceptions or extensions of 
the time limit may be granted upon the request of the applicant after an 
administrative decision, and any adverse determinations could be 
appealed to the federal courts for judicial review. Reasons for extensions 
or excusal of the time limit might include a female’s inability to travel 
due to illness, pregnancy, death, and other similar reasons that would 
prevent either the female from coming to the United States. However, the 
immigration officers must construe any such exceptions narrowly so as 
to not eradicate the entire purpose of the legislative amendment. 
In addition to the conditional-grant system, IMFA also stiffened 
a number of other provisions with the goal of preventing and punishing 
marriage fraud. These included the strengthening of the restrictions on 
immigration for anyone who has ever been involved in marriage fraud211 
and the establishment of criminal sanctions for involvement in marriage 
fraud, with harsh penalties of up to a $250,000 fine and five years in 
prison.212 Once again, these same ideas should be extended to include 
under their scope fraudulent claims made under section 601(a). Finally, 
the Department of Justice should start to crack down and impose harsher 
  
 209 This idea is similar to how the United States currently deals with aliens who try to 
obtain permanent residency based on marriage to U.S. citizens. Immigration officials assume that the 
marriage was entered into solely to obtain permanent resident status in the U.S., and thus the alien is 
only granted a two-year conditional grant of residency, after which the alien, together with his or her 
American spouse, must petition immigration to take away the conditions so that the alien can then 
become a legal permanent resident rather than a conditional legal permanent resident. See U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, How Do I Remove the Conditions on Permanent Residence 
Based on Marriage?, http://www.uscis.gov (search “How do I remove”; then follow first hyperlink) 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2009). 
 210  In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 916 (BIA 1997). 
 211 8 U.S.C § 1154. 
 212 Id. § 1325. 
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disciplinary sanctions on lawyers who knowingly participate in these 
fraudulent claims.213  
Note, however, that such a system will only work to deter 
fraudulent claims if males actually abide by it and see a real incentive to 
come forward and petition for the removal of their conditional status 
rather than disappearing in the system as they previously would have 
done,214 especially when their underlying claim was a fraudulent one. 
However, the incentive to come forward does exist. Under the new 
proposed system, the alien’s visa papers will clearly be marked as 
expiring at the end of the two-year period. Thus, the male who fails to 
come forward to try to make his case will become an illegal alien, unable 
to legally work in the United States and unable to go and come from the 
United States as they please. This is unlike the system that is currently in 
place, in which there is no conditional element at all—once the refugee is 
accepted under section 601(a) that status can last forever. The idea here 
is that a Chinese male whose female partner has not actually been 
persecuted under section 601(a) might not go through all the trouble of 
trekking to the United States on an often costly and difficult journey, and 
hoping that the couple’s fraudulent claim will at least initially be 
believed, where, even if it is believed, in two years time they will 
become illegal aliens, subject to deportation when they fail to petition to 
remove the conditions on their asylum status.215 Just like in the marriage 
fraud context, the reduction of the potential benefits of using a fraudulent 
claim, coupled with the increased costs of being caught using such a 
fraudulent claim, can act a strong deterrent to making these fraudulent 
claims in the first place.  
Not only would the conditional-grant system ideally act as a 
strong deterrent, it would also serve the often-discussed congressional 
intent of keeping families together. Indeed, many of the circuit courts 
that interpreted section 601(a) to be silent regarding indirect victims, 
relied on the breaking-up-of-families rationale in determining that per se 
relief should be granted to indirect male spouses.216 The concerns of the 
Third Circuit that a policy granting per se relief to an indirect male 
spouse allows him to “capitalize on the persecution of his wife to obtain 
asylum even though he has left his wife behind and she might never join 
  
 213 Current immigration regulations impose disciplinary sanctions on any attorney who 
“knowingly or with reckless disregard makes a false statement of material fact or law, or willfully 
misleads, misinforms, threatens or deceives any person (including a party to a case or an officer or 
employee of the Department of Justice) . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(c) (2009).  
 214 Kung, supra note 1, at 1295 (“If released, they may never return to court and will 
simply vanish into Chinese migrant communities in the U.S.”). 
 215 Note, however, that the proposed legislation would probably do little to deter those 
aliens who do not care about being illegal aliens. 
 216 See, e.g., Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 561 (9th Cir. 2004) (where the court notes that 
not granting per se relief could lead to the absurd result of breaking up the family, which would not 
only be “at odds” with the purpose of section 601(a), but also with U.S. immigration policy as a 
whole). 
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him and he might intend that she not do so” would also be relieved.217 A 
male who is claiming asylum based solely on his wife’s persecution 
should not be able to gain the benefits of asylum based on his wife’s 
persecution if the wife herself does not gain those benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
Until Congress adopts new legislation, the Lin decision is the 
best of the circuit decisions and should be adopted by the Supreme Court 
if it decides to grant certiorari to resolve this circuit split. However, the 
best possible solution would be for Congress to adopt legislation that 
puts into place a system of conditional grants of asylum relief for indirect 
male partners of female victims of Chinese birth control policies. Not 
only will such an approach eliminate the current confusion regarding 
how far C-Y-Z-’s holding extends in protecting such victims, but it will 
also help to keep families together by preventing males from abandoning 
their wives in China once they have gained refugee status in the United 
States. Furthermore, and most critically, a conditional grants system will 
help ensure that females who have been persecuted in China will be able 
to take advantage of the protections of section 601(a) more often, and it 
will reduce exploitation of section 601(a) by deterring males from 
memorizing tales of their partner’s persecution as a mere pretext to gain 
asylum in the United States. In light of the ongoing human rights 
violations in China under the guise of population control, the U.S. should 
do whatever it can to help those who have really been persecuted, while 
also trying to limit section 601(a) from becoming a tool under which any 
Chinese citizen can easily gain the benefits of refugee status in the 
United States. The system of conditional grants described above appears 
to be the best way to achieve these dual goals.  
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